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I.  Introduction 
 
A number of authors have recently argued that (some) emerging nations should 
give up their domestic currency, and adopt an advanced nation’s currency as legal tender.  
This policy option has received the generic name of “official dollarization,” even if the 
advanced country’s currency is other than the dollar.  
There is wide agreement among economists that countries that give up their 
currency, and delegate monetary policy to an advanced country’s (conservative) central 
bank, will tend to have lower inflation than countries that pursue an active domestic 
monetary policy.  Indeed, dollarization allows these countries to deal with the 
inflationary-bias associated with monetary institutions that lack credibility.
1  Recent 
empirical analyses provide broad support to this hypothesis.  Work by Engel and Rose 
(2002), Boegitc (2000), Eichengreen and Hausman (1999), Edwards (2001) and Edwards 
and Magendzo (2003) has found that dollarized and currency union countries have had a 
significantly lower rate of inflation than countries with a domestic currency.   
There is much less agreement, however, on the effects of dollarization on real 
economic variables, such as growth, employment and volatility.  According to its 
supporters, dollarization will positively affect growth through two channels: First, 
dollarization will tend to result in lower interest rates, higher investment and faster 
growth (Dornbusch 2001).  And second, by eliminating currency risk, a common 
currency is supposed to encourage international trade; this, in turn, will result in faster 
growth.  Rose (2000), and Rose and Van Wincoop (2001), among others, have 
emphasized this trade channel.
 Other authors, however, have been skeptical regarding the 
alleged benefits of dollarization. Indeed, according to a view that goes back at least to 
Meade (1950), countries with a hard peg – including dollarized countries – will have 
difficulties accommodating external shocks, including terms of trade and world interest 
rate disturbances. This, in turn, will be translated into greater instability and, under some 
circumstances, may even lead to lower economic growth (Fischer 1976; Parrado and 
Velasco, 2002). Frankel (1999) has taken an intermediate position, arguing that there is 
no unique recipe on exchange rate policy; while some countries will benefit from hard 
                                                           
1  See, for example, Cooper and Kempf (2001), Alesina and Barro (2000), Calvo (1999), and Eichengreen 
and Hausmann (1999).   2
pegs, for other countries a floating regime will be more appropriate. According to him, 
the answer to the dollarization question will depend on the type of structural variables 
discussed by Mundell (1961) in his classical article on optimal currency areas.  
Eichengreen (2001) has taken an even more pragmatic view, and has argued that the 
evidence on the relationship between monetary regimes and growth is largely 
inconclusive, and does not support the claim that the exchange rate regime is an 
important determinant of growth. 
What is surprising about this debate, however, is that there have been very few 
empirical comparative analyses on economic performance under dollarized monetary 
regimes.  Indeed, most cross-country studies on the subject have focused on “independent 
currency unions,” and have included very few observations on strictly dollarized 
countries.  For instance, the Engel and Rose (2002) data set includes 26 countries that do 
not have a currency of their own, and have data on real GDP per capita.  Of these, only 
seven use another nation’s currency, and only two -- Panama and Puerto Rico -- use a 
convertible currency as legal tender, and are thus “strictly dollarized” countries.
2 The 
comprehensive study on exchange rate regimes, growth, and inflation by Gosh et al 
(1995), does not include nations that do not have a currency of their own.  The IMF 
(1997) study on alternative exchange rate systems excluded dollarized countries and the 
recent paper by Levy-Yeyeti and Sturzenegger (2001) on exchange rates and economic 
performance did not include nations that do not have a central bank.  It is not an 
exaggeration to say that until recently, most existing evidence on dollarization was based 
on the experience of Panama, a country that has used the US dollar as legal tender since 
1904.
3   
The purpose of this paper is to analyze empirically the historical macroeconomic 
record of strictly dollarized economies.
4 More specifically, we are interested in 
investigating whether dollarization is associated with superior macroeconomic 
performance, as measured by faster GDP growth and lower GDP growth volatility. The 
                                                           
2   This is also the case of the influential paper by Frankel and Rose (2002). 
3  Goldfjan and Olivares (2001) use econometrics to evaluate Panama’s experience with dollarization.  
Moreno-Villalaz (1999) provides a detailed analysis of the Panamanian system.  Bogetic (2000) describes 
several aspects of dollarization in a number of countries.  As far as we know, Engel and Rose (2002) and 
Edwards (2001) are the first two papers to provide a statistical and econometric analysis of economic 
performance in dollarized countries and/or currency unions.     3
reason for focusing on strictly dollarized countries is rather simple: to a large extent the 
policy debate in the emerging world is whether these countries ought to adopt an 
“advanced” country's currency, as a way of achieving credibility.  For Argentina, for 
instance, it is very different to delegate the running of monetary policy to the Federal 
Reserve, than delegating it to a MERCOSUR central bank that would be run by Brazilians 
and Argentines.  Argentine politicians and economists rightly ask whether the latter 
would have any more credibility than their own embattled Central Bank.
5   
Comparing economic performance in dollarized countries and in countries with a 
currency of their own is not an easy task, however.  The problem is how to define an 
appropriate “control” group with which to compare the dollarized nations. In this paper 
we tackle this issue by using a treatment regressions technique that estimates jointly the 
probability of being a dollarized country, and outcome equations on GDP per capita 
growth and on growth volatility.
6  
  Our analysis on the probability of a country being strictly dollarized relies on 
two strands of literature: the optimal currency areas literature pioneered by Mundell 
(1961), and the literature on the political economy of exchange rate and currency 
regimes.  Scholars working on political economy have recently focused on two issues that 
are closely related to the subject of this paper. First, some authors have argued that the 
adoption of hard pegs has little to do with achieving credibility and low inflation; instead 
it responds to politicians interests in generating superior performance in terms of real 
economic variables (Frieden 2002, 2003). The results reported in this paper provide 
information on whether strictly dollarized regimes have indeed generated stronger (real) 
performance than countries with a domestic currency.  Second, Bernhard et al. (2002) and 
Freeman (2002), among others, have recently argued that it is important to analyze jointly 
episodes where hard pegs and central bank independence reinforce themselves as 
“credibility enhancing” institutions. The analysis of growth and volatility performance 
under strict dollarization provides a unique opportunity for analyzing the experience of a 
group of countries that have done precisely this.  Indeed, dollarization is an extreme 
                                                                                                                                                                             
4  In Edwards and Magendzo (2003) we investigate the case of all types of currency unions. 
5 For an analysis of independent currency unions see, for example, Edwards and Magendzo (2002).   4
monetary regime where the country has the hardest of hard pegs, and where central bank 
independence from local politicians is complete – after all, monetary policy is fully 
delegated to foreigners.   
Our analysis differs from other related work in this general area in several 
respects. First, we have made an effort to include data on a large number of strictly 
dollarized countries.  This has not been easy, as most strictly dollarized countries are very 
small and their data are not included in readily available data sets.  After significant effort 
we were able to obtain data on GDP per capita growth and inflation for 20 strictly 
dollarized countries.  Our data set, then, is significantly more general than the data set 
used by other researchers, including Rose and Engel (2002).  Second, we focus directly 
on two of the most important real macroeconomic variables – real GDP per capita 
growth, and growth volatility.  Other studies, in contrast, have analyzed performance in 
an indirect fashion, and have focused on ancillary variables such as the level of 
international trade and/or interest rates. For instance, Frankel and Rose (2002) have 
analyzed the way in which currency unions affect bilateral trade, while Edwards (1999), 
and Powel and Sturzenegger (2003) have investigated the way in which the exchange 
rate/monetary regime affects interest rate behavior and the cost of capital.
 7  Third, and as 
pointed out earlier, our empirical approach allows us to estimate jointly the probability of 
being a “strictly dollarized country” and the effect of dollarization on two outcome 
variables.  Fourth, we explicitly introduce political economy considerations into the 
analysis.  That is, we investigate whether, as suggested by credibility-based models, 
countries with an inflationary “propensity” have a higher probability of being strictly 
dollarized.
8  And finally, in order to check for the robustness of the results we also use 
non-parametric matching techniques. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II we provide a 
preliminary analysis of historical experiences with “dollarization.” In Section III we use 
“treatment regressions” to analyze the effects of “dollarization” on GDP per capita 
                                                                                                                                                                             
6   Ideally, we would have liked to include consumption volatility.  Unfortunately, many of the small 
dollarized countries do not have data on consumption.  On treatment regression models see, for example, 
Maddala (1983), Green (2000) and Wooldridge (2002). 
7   See Klein (2002) for a discussion on dollarization and trade, including a comprehensive bibliography on 
the subject.   5
growth and volatility. In Section IV we deal with extensions and with robustness.  We 
investigate whether different samples and estimation techniques affect the results.  In 
particular, we report results on comparative performance obtained from an analysis that 
uses “matching estimators.”  Finally in Section V we provide some concluding remarks. 
II.  Strict Dollarization During 1970-1998 
Countries that use a foreign convertible currency as legal tender may be divided 
into two groups: The first one corresponds to independent nations, while the second 
group includes territories, colonies or regions within a national entity.  Panama is an 
example of the first group, while Puerto Rico belongs to the second group. Table 1 
contains a list of countries and territories that have had an official dollarized system at 
any time during the 1970-1998 period, and that have data on key macroeconomic 
variables such as inflation and GDP growth.
 9 These countries are very small indeed, and 
many are city-states well integrated into their neighbors’ economies – Monaco, 
Liechtenstein, and Andorra are good examples.  In fact, many of the dollarized 
economies are so small that they do not have data on basic economic indicators such as 
inflation or growth.  
As may be seen from Table 1, we have been able to collect data on GDP per 
capita growth for 20 dollarized countries and territories. There are a number of other very 
small countries with dollarized monetary systems, which don’t have data on economic 
performance. Some of these are: Vatican City, Coco Island, Guam, Niue, Norfolk Island, 
North Marianas, Pitcairn, Saint Helena, Tokelau and the Turks & Caicos.  For a complete 
list see Edwards and Magendzo (2001).  Notice that in spite of the fact that we only have 
20 countries, our data set is significantly larger than those used by other researchers.  For 
example, and as we pointed out in the introduction, in the Rose and Engel (2002) and 
Frankel and Rose (2002) data sets there are only two strictly dollarized countries.  Most 
of their sample is comprised of “independent currency union” countries (See Edwards 
and Magendzo 2003, for an analysis of currency unions.) 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8   For discussions on the political economy of exchange rate regimes see, for example, Persson and 
Tabellini (2000). 
9   We follow the U.S. Congress’ Joint Economic Committee, and concentrate on those territories that have 
a high degree of administrative autonomy.  There are some borderline cases, however, that may generate 
some controversies.      6
The largest independent dollarized countries in Table 1 are Liberia and Panama.  
Only the latter, however, remains dollarized today.
10  The vast majority of the countries 
in Table 1 are extremely open, and in most of them there are no controls on capital 
mobility or on any type of financial transactions.  So much so, that as recently as 2001 six 
out of the 14 independent dollarized nations in Table 1 were in the OECD’s list of 
“Unfair Tax Havens,” or countries whose financial regulations allegedly allow 
individuals and corporations to evade taxes.  These fundamental characteristics of the 
dollarized economies – very small and extremely open – already suggest that using a 
broad control group of all non-dollarized countries, which are much larger and not as 
open, may indeed generate biased results.
11  Finally, only one country in Table 1 has 
switched monetary regimes within the timeframe of our sample.  In 1982 Liberia 
abandoned dollarization, when the government of President Samuel Doe decided to issue 
local currency as a way of avoiding the constraints imposed on macroeconomic policy by 
the lack of a domestic currency.  This means that it is not possible to perform an 
empirical analysis based on a diffs-in-diffs methodology.
12 
 
III.  Dollarization and Real Macroeconomic Performance: The Evidence 
III.1   The Empirical Model 
Our main interest is to undertake a comparative analysis on the conditional effect 
of a “dollarization” on real macroeconomic performance. In order to do this, we estimate 
jointly an “outcome equation” and an equation on the probability of being a dollarized 
country.  More specifically, we consider two outcome variables: GDP per capita growth 
and growth volatility.
13 The data set covers 1970 through 1998, and includes 169 counties 
                                                           
10  Liberia abandoned the use of the U.S. dollar in 1982.  See Edwards and Magendzo (2003). 
11   The median population of all non-dollarized emerging nations is over 100 times larger than that of the 
dollarized economies. 
12   In the last few years some countries have dollarized, including Ecuador in 2000 and El Salvador in 
2001. 
13 In principle, the monetary/exchange rate regime will affect the growth process – both the first and second 
moments -- through three potential channels.  First, a lower cost of capital – usually associated with 
dollarized economies --, will result in a higher rate of physical capital accumulation and a higher rate of 
growth of potential output.  Second, a high level of international trade – which, as Rose and his coauthors 
have persuasively shown is associated with common currency regimes – is likely to have a positive effect 
on TFP growth, and on the rate of GDP growth.  This effect has been emphasized in a number of 
endogenous growth models, and operates through the effect of openness on the accumulation of 
knowledge.  And third, since the exchange rate regime will affect the country’s ability to accommodate   7
and territories. There are 3,966 observations on growth per capita.  When using 5 years 
averages – both in the growth and volatility models – the panel has 720 observations.
14  
Countries with a currency union -- such as the CFA countries in Africa --, are excluded 
from the analysis). 
The empirical model is given by equations (1) through (4):    
 
(1)        y  j t =  x j t β + γ δ j + µ j t 
 
                                   1,    if    δ * j t   > 0 
(2)       δ j t   =        
                       0,     otherwise 
 
(3)     δ * j t =    w j t α  + ε j t . 
 
Equation (1) is the macroeconomic performance or outcome equation, where y j t stands 
for each of the macroeconomic outcome variables of interest in country j and period t; x j 
t is a vector of covariates that capture the role of traditional determinants of economic 
performance.  δ j t is a dummy variable (i.e. the treatment variable) that takes a value of 
one if country j in period t is “strictly dollarized” country, and zero if the country has a 
currency of its own. µ j t is an error term, whose properties are discussed below. β and γ 
are parameters to be estimated.  The common currency dummy is assumed to be the 
result of an unobserved latent variable δ* j t, as described in equation (2).  δ* j, in turn, is 
assumed to depend linearly on vector w j t.  Some of the variables in w j t may be included 
                                                                                                                                                                             
external terms of trade shocks, it will affect growth volatility and, possibly, average growth.  Indeed, if as 
Dornbusch (1982) and Corden (2002), have argued, countries with a hard peg – including strictly dollarized 
countries -- have more difficulties accommodating external disturbances, they will tend to exhibit, on 
average, a lower and more volatile rate of growth than countries with a domestic currency. 
 
14 The volatility variable is measured as the standard deviation of growth over a five year period.  When 
alternative 7-year periods were used, there were no significant changes in the results.   8
in x j t  (Maddala 1983, p. 120).
15   α is a parameters vector to be estimated, and ε j is an 
error term.  Error terms µj t and ε j t are assumed to be bivariate normal, with a zero mean 
and a covariance matrix given by: 
 
         σ  ς 
(4)          ς 1   
 
If the performance and dollarization equations are independent, the covariance term ς in 
equation (4) will be zero.  Under most plausible conditions, however, it is likely that this 
covariance term will be different from zero. 
As shown by Greene (2000), the log likelihood for observation k is: 
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  If equation (1) is estimated by least squares, the treatment effect will be 
overestimated -- see Greene (2000, p. 934). In this paper we use a two step procedure to 
estimate the model in equations (1) through (4). In the first step, the treatment equation 
(2) is estimated using probit regressions.  From this estimation a hazard is obtained for 
each j,t observation.  In the second step, the outcome equation (1) is estimated with the 
hazard added as an additional covariate.  From the residuals of this augmented outcome 
regression, it is possible to compute consistent estimates of the variance-covariance 
matrix (4) (See Maddala 1983, and Wooldridge 2002 for details). 
                                                           
15   It is assumed, however, that δ * j t does not depend on y j t.  Otherwise, as discussed below, the model   9
The model in equations (1) – (4) will satisfy the consistency and identifying 
conditions of mixed models with latent variables if the outcome variable y j t is not a 
determinant of the treatment equation -- that is, if y is not one of the variables in w in 
equation (3).
16 For the case under study this is a reasonable assumption.  Although the 
initial level of GDP per capita may affect the probability of being a dollarized country, its 
rate of change, or the second moment of its rate of change is unlikely to have an impact 
on the decision of having a domestic currency.  See Maddala (1983), Heckman (1978), 
Angrist (2000) and Wooldridge (2002) for further discussions on these issues.  As is clear 
in the discussion that follows, in the estimation of the model (1)-(4) we impose a number 
of exclusionary restrictions; that is, a number of variables in vector wj t are not included 
in vector xj t.  
III.2  Basic Results  
In this section we report the results obtained from the estimation of the treatment 
effects model given by equations (1) through (4).  We proceed as follows: We first 
discuss the specification used for the first-stage probit equation on the probability of 
being a dollarized country.  An important feature of this analysis is that we explicitly use 
a “credibility index” as a (possible) determinant of this probability.  We then discuss the 
specification for both outcome equations on GDP per capita growth and on growth 
volatility.  Finally, we present the results from the (joint) estimation of both models.  In 
Section IV we deal with extensions and with robustness issues.  
III.2.1 Equation Specification 
a. The Treatment Equation: In specifying the treatment equation (3) on the 
probability of being a dollarized country, we draw on two interrelated bodies of work: (1) 
optimal currency areas analyses; and (2) the political economy of exchange rate regimes.  
In a highly influential article, Mundell (1961, p. 181) argued that the “optimum currency 
area is the region.”  By this he meant that regional considerations – geographical 
proximity and the existence of factor mobility, among other – were more important than 
national (or sovereign) considerations in determining optimal currency areas.  This 
regional-based approach has been present in most subsequent work on the subject of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
cannot be identified. 
16 Details on identification and consistency of models with mixed structures can be found in Maddala 
(1983).  See, also, Heckman (1978) and Angrist (2000).   10
optimal currency areas.
17  Following Mundell’s insight, we include a number of “regional 
variables” in our empirical analysis on the probability of being a “dollarized” country.  
More specifically, in the specification of the treatment equation (3), we included the 
following covariates that encapsulate the importance of the “region:”  (a) a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the economy in question is an independent nation, 
and zero if it is a territory.  Since factor mobility is much lower across independent 
nations than between a dependent territory and the “home country”, we expect the 
coefficient of this variable to be negative in the estimation of equation (3).
18 (b) A 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if the country has a common border with a 
nation whose currency the IMF defines as a “convertible currency.”  We call this variable 
“border,” and we expect its estimated coefficient to have a positive sign in equation (3). 
(c) In some specifications we also used a dummy variable that takes the value of one if 
the country in question is an island or archipelago.  Since island-archipelago countries are 
relatively isolated, they tend to be self-contained regions. We expect this variable to have 
a negative coefficient in (3). 
The political economy literature, on the other hand, has emphasized both 
credibility and distributive issues. From a credibility perspective, countries that give up 
their domestic currency are countries that are willing to “tie their hands.” These are 
usually countries where temptation to inflate is significant, and/or countries whose 
monetary institutions lack credibility (Person and Tabellini, 2000). Frieden (2003) has 
argued that from a distributive perspective, politically powerful groups will try to 
influence the selection of the exchange rate regime in a way that benefits their interests.  
According to Frieden (2003), since dollarization eliminates currency risk, this regime will 
have a high degree of political support in countries with a large external sector and a high 
degree of openness (See also Freeman 2002, and Bernhard et al 2002).  Based on these 
views, in the estimation of the treatment equation we also included two political economy 
covariates: (d) an index that captures the credibility motive for dollarizing.  This index 
was constructed as a composite of institutional, structural and economic variables that 
affect the authorities’ decision to “tie their hands” (see the Appendix to this paper for the 
                                                           
17 See Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro (2002) for a recent discussion on the subject. 
18 As Mill (1848) pointed out, whether a country is independent is also a political economy variable, as 
nations usually affirm their sovereignty by having a currency of their own.   11
details).
19  We called this index credibility. Its sign to be negative, as higher numbers 
reflect a higher degree of credibility. (e) An indicator of the degree of openness of the 
economy; as suggested by Frieden (2003), among others, we expect its estimated 
coefficient sign to be positive.  For the majority of countries we used the Sachs and 
Warner (1995) openness index.   We used data from a variety of sources to supplement 
the Sachs-Warner index for those countries and years not covered in their sample.
20   
In addition to these regional and political economy variables
21, the following 
covariates were also included in the specification of the treatment equation (3):  (f) the 
log of population measured in millions of people, as an index of the country’s size. We 
expect the estimated coefficient of this variable to be negative, indicating that larger 
countries are less likely to use another nation’s currency.  (g) The log of initial (1970) 
GDP, taken as a measure of the country’s economic size.  We also expect the coefficient 
of this variable to be negative. And, (h) a variable that measures the (log of the) distance 
between each country and global markets; in defining this “distance variable” we 
followed Leamer (1997).  We expect its estimated coefficient to be negative indicating 
that countries that are less integrated to world markets will have a lower probability of 
being common currency countries.  
b. The Outcome Equations: Our analysis focused on two outcome variables: (a) 
GDP per capita growth, (b) growth volatility.  A difficulty we faced in undertaking this 
analysis is that most of the “dollarized” countries have limited data availability.  For 
instance, almost none of the strictly dollarized countries have data on education 
attainment or on some other variables traditionally included in growth empirical analyses 
(Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1995, Barro, 1996).  Indeed, popular data sets, such as the 
World Bank WDI, the IFS or the Barro-Lee (1996) data set, include data on only a 
                                                           
19 More specifically, we used two alternative methods to construct the credibility index:  principal 
components and a regression-based index.  The variables used to construct both versions of the the 
credibility index are: legal origin of institutions, years since independence, political instability (instability), 
a dummy for exporters of non-fuel primary products, and “neighborhood inflation.”  See the appendix for 
details. Results for both indexes were qualitatively identical and quantitatively very similar. We present 
only the index constructed using principal components. The alternative index was built as the fitted value of 
a regression of inflation on the variables specified above. The correlation between both indexes was 0.89. 
20   See the original Sachs-Werner (1995) article for a specific list of requirements for a country to qualify 
as “open.” 
21 Unfortunately, there are no available data on other regional variables of interest, including a generalized 
index of factor mobility or of synchronicity of shocks, for all countries in our sample.    12
handful (three or four) strictly dollarized countries.  Nevertheless, and after searching in a 
number of alternative data sources, we were been able to include a number of covariates 
in the outcome equations (1) for per capita growth, and volatility.
22  In the estimation of 
the GDP growth model we included, as customary, initial GDP, a measure of openness, a 
variable that captures the country’s geographical location, regional dummies (no 
dummies were included for Asia, which is defined as the reference region),
23 and the 
“common currency” dummy.  As Sachs (2000), among others, has argued, countries 
located close to the equator tend to grow more slowly than nations in other parts of the 
world.  Our geography variable -- which we call “tropics”-- is defined as the (normalized) 
absolute distance from each country to the equator
24.  We expect its coefficient to be 
negative, capturing the fact that, with other things constant, countries closer to the tropics 
will tend to grow at a slower rate than countries in other geographical areas.
25  
In the volatility model we include the following covariates in the outcome 
equation: initial GDP, openness, the regional dummies and the dollarization dummy.  As 
in the growth models, in some of the specifications we introduced regional dummy 
variables.  A number of factors suggest that the poorer countries have a limited capacity 
to absorb external shocks – they lack well developed domestic capital markets, have 
limited access to international borrowing and their exports are concentrated in a small 
number of commodities.  Consequently, in the volatility model we expect that the 
estimated coefficient of initial GDP to be negative.  Frenkel and Razin (1987), among 
others, have suggested that external shock will get amplified in countries that are 
relatively closed to international trade.  According to their intertemporal models, more 
open economies will tend to have a lower degree of volatility.  Thus, we expect that the 
coefficient of openness will be negative in the volatility models. 
III.2.2  Main Results 
In Table 2 we summarize the results obtained from the estimation of treatment 
models for GDP per capita growth and for growth volatility. The table contains two 
panels.  The upper panel includes the results from the outcome equation; the lower panel 
                                                           
22  The data are available from the authors on request. 
23  These variables are expected to capture the effect of some of variables for which there were no data. 
24  According to this definition, the equator receives a value of zero and the poles a value of –1.   13
contains the estimates for the “treatment equation.” As pointed out above, the treatment 
countries corresponds to the strictly dollarized countries in Table 1, and the untreated 
group is comprised of all countries with a currency of their own.  In Section IV, however, 
we report results for the case where the untreated group is formed by countries with a 
pegged regime.   
Probability of Being a Common Currency Country The results are reported in the 
lower panel for two sample sizes: a 3,966-observation sample, and a 720-observation data 
set of five years averages.  As may be seen, the results are similar across models and are 
quite satisfactory.  The majority of the coefficients have the expected signs, and are 
statistically significant at conventional levels.  These results indicate that the probability 
of being a “dollarized” country is higher for very small, not independent countries (i.e. 
territories), that are also very open. Sharing a border with a country with a convertible 
currency increases the probability of being a dollarized country, while distance is not a 
significant determinant of this probability.
26  As may be noted, the estimated coefficient 
of the credibility index is significantly negative, indicating that countries with higher 
levels of macroeconomic credibility will be less prone to tying their hands through the 
adoption of a hard peg and dollarization. 
GDP per Capita Growth and Growth Volatility: Models 1 through 3 in Table 2 
are for the growth model.  We report results from three systems: the first two were 
estimated using annual data, while the third was estimated using five-year averages. As 
may be seen, the traditional regressors have the expected signs and are significant at 
conventional levels: initial GDP has a negative coefficient suggesting that there is 
“conditional convergence;” openness has a positive coefficient indicating that more open 
economies have tended to exhibit a higher rate of GDP growth.  The “tropics” variable 
has an only marginally significant negative coefficient, confirming that geography plays 
an important role in the growth process.  In terms of the exchange rate regime, these 
results show that the coefficient of the “dollarization” dummy is positive, but not 
                                                                                                                                                                             
25 See Leamer (1997) and Venables et al. (2002) for discussions on the role of geography and distance on 
economic growth. 
26  In addition to the variables in tables 3-6, we considered additional covariates.  In particular, we 
constructed an index on whether the country in question was a member of a “deep” trading area.  This 
index, however, identifies almost fully the “common currency” countries, reducing the spirit of the 
analysis.   14
statistically significant in any of the specifications.  This indicates that, during the period 
under consideration, and after controlling for other factors, countries with a “strictly 
dollarized” regime have not performed differently, in terms of GDP growth per capita, 
than countries with a currency of their own.  These results provide some evidence against 
the claim, made by dollarization supporters, that dollarized countries tend to grow faster 
than countries with a currency of their own. 
Models 4 and 5 in Table 2 refer to volatility.  As may be seen, the dummy 
variable for “strict dollarization” is significantly positive, indicating that countries 
without a domestic currency have experienced a higher degree of volatility than countries 
with a currency of their own. The point estimates of these dummies (2.1 and 2.8) are 
significantly higher than the simple mean difference of volatility in dollarized and non-
dollarized countries – that simple difference is  0.8 and not statistically significant.  With 
regard to the other covariates, the results in Table 2 confirm our prior that openness 
reduces volatility – a result that is in line with a number of theoretical results in 
international economics.
27  In addition, our estimates indicate that, after controlling by 
other factors, countries with a higher initial level of GDP per capita have had a somewhat 
higher degree of volatility (the point estimate of this coefficient is, however, rather low). 
Also, countries that are closer to the equator have exhibited a higher degree of volatility. 
The estimates of the regional dummies, indicate that growth in the countries of the 
Middle East (MENA) has been particularly volatile.  The dummy for Eastern and Central 
Europe is positive, although not significant.   
IV.   Further Results and Robustness Analysis  
In this section we investigate the robustness of the results both with respect to 
estimation methods as well as samples.   
IV.1  Non-Parametric Methods 
  It is possible that the specification forms chosen for the outcome equations affect 
the results reported above.  In particular, the linearity of these equations may affect the 
estimates of the “treatment coefficient.”  In order to investigate whether this is an 
important factor, we undertook a non-parametric analysis based on “matching estimators” 
(see Blundell and Costa-Dias 2000). A general advantage of this non-parametric method 
                                                           
27   See Frenkel and Razin (1987).   15
is that no particular specification of the underlying model has to be assumed. Matching 
estimators pair each common currency country with countries from the with-domestic-
currency group.
 28  If the sample is large enough, for each treated (common currency) 
observation we can find, in principle, at least one untreated observation with exactly the 
same characteristics.  Each of these properly selected untreated observations provides the 
required counterfactual for our comparative analysis.
29  The problem is that under most 
general conditions it is not possible to find an exact match between a treated and 
untreated observation. The matching estimator method focuses on estimating an average 
version of the parameter of interest.
30 That is, the matching estimator consists of 
obtaining the difference in outcome as an average of the differences with respect to 
“similar” -- rather than identical -- untreated outcomes. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
have shown that an efficient and simple way to perform this comparison is to rely on a 
propensity score, defined as the probability of participation or treatment: 
P(x)=Prob(D=1/ x). In our case, this is the probability of a country being a strictly 
dollarized country. This reduces a multi-dimensional problem to a one-dimensional 
problem, provided that we can estimate P(x). Instead of matching countries directly on all 
of their characteristics, we can compare countries with similar probability of being a 
strictly dollarized country.  An additional advantage of this method is that the estimation 
of the treatment on the treated is not affected by the lack of data on some of the other 
variables affecting the outcome.  In that regard, then, this method provides us with an 
                                                           
28 If we estimate the equation above using all non-treated observations the selection bias is given by: 
  ) 0 , / ( ) 1 , / ( ) ( 0 0 = − = = D x u E D x u E x B . 
29 In order to guarantee that all treated agents have such a counterpart in the population (not necessarily in 
the sample) we also need to assume that  1 ) / 1 ( Pr 0 < = < x D ob . 
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where S is a subset of the support of x given D=1.   16
elegant way of handling potential problems emanating from omitted variables in the 
outcome equations.
31  
In this section we report results obtained from using a simple-average nearest 
neighbor estimator. According to this method, for each treated observation, we select a 
pre-determined number of untreated nearest neighbor(s). The nearest neighbors of a 
particular treated observation i are defined as those untreated observations that have the 
smallest difference in propensity score with respect to i. If we choose to use nn nearest 




=  for the observations that have been selected; for other 
observations we set  ij W =0.  We applied the above method to both one nearest neighbor 
and five nearest neighbors.   
When we used a “five nearest neighbors” matching estimator (without 
replacement), the following mean differences (t-statistics in parentheses) were obtained:
32   
 
•  GDP per capita growth:   -1.11  (1.98) 
•  GDP growth volatility:      1.18  (2.84) 
 
 In terms of GDP growth, these results strengthened the conclusions obtained 
from the treatment regressions reported in Table 3.  Indeed, the matching estimator mean 
difference is still negative, but it is now statistically significant.   The matching result for 
volatility confirms the treatment regression finding, and indicates that during the period 
under consideration dollarized countries have had more volatile growth than countries 
with a currency of their own.  Notice that according to the matching results, the 
difference in volatility has been smaller than what is suggested by the treatment 
regression results (1.18 vs. 2.08). 
IV.2  Alternative Samples  
  In the preceding section we analyzed whether dollarized economies had 
outperformed – in terms of GDP growth and volatility – countries with a currency of their 
                                                           
31   This assumes that there are no omitted variables problems in the estimation of the propensity used to 
select the nearest neighbors. 
32   The propensity score equations were specified as those reported in the lower panel of  Table 2.   17
own.  That is, in the results reported above, the “untreated group” is comprised of all 
countries with a domestic currency, independently of their exchange rate regime.   
  Many countries that have recently considered adopting a dollarized regime have, 
in fact, been countries that already had a pegged exchange rate regime – two such cases 
are Argentina (which ultimately rejected dollarization) and El Salvador (which adopted 
official dollarization). We can gain some insights on the differential performance in 
countries with dollarized and pegged exchange rate regimes by estimating treatment 
regression models where the “untreated group” is restricted to countries with a pegged 
exchange rate.  In performing this analysis we use the classification of de facto exchange 
rate regimes proposed by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001).
33  The results obtained 
in this case are reported in Table 3.  As may be seen, in the growth equations the 
dollarization dummy is positive but insignificant.  On the other hand, the dollarization 
dummy is significantly negative in the volatility equation; its point estimates, however, 
are lower than those reported in Table 2, where the untreated group included all countries 
with a currency of their own.  Most of the other covariates have the expected sign and are 
significant at conventional levels. The results reported in Table 3, then, suggest that 
during the period under consideration, real economic performance in dollarized countries 
has not been better than in pegged exchange rate countries: growth has not been 
significantly different, while volatility has been somewhat higher in the dollarized 
countries.  We conjecture that the reason for this result is that pegged rate countries still 
have some ability to use monetary policy in the short run to help accommodate external 
shocks. 
V.  Concluding Remarks 
As a consequence of the emerging markets’ currency crises of the 1990s, a 
number of economists have argued that the emerging economies should give up their 
domestic currencies, and become “strictly dollarized.”  Interestingly, there have been 
very few systematic comparative studies on the performance of countries that, indeed, do 
not have a currency of their own.  Moreover, most of the literature on the subject has, in 
fact, been based on analyses of groups of countries strongly dominated by currency union 
                                                           
33   This classification uses cluster analysis on three variables to classify exchange rate regimes.  The 
resulting classification is somewhat different than the traditional de jure classification from the 
International Monetary Fund.   18
countries; these studies have included very few observations on “strictly dollarized” 
countries.   
The purpose of this paper has been to analyze, from a comparative perspective, 
economic performance in strictly dollarized economies.  A difficulty in performing this 
type of analysis refers to defining the “control group” with which to compare the 
performance of the dollarized countries.  In this paper we tackled this issue by using the 
“treatment effects model” developed in the labor economics literature; this method allows 
us to jointly estimate the probability of being a “strictly dollarized country,” and the 
effect of having this particular monetary regime on specific macroeconomic outcomes.  
Estimates using this technique yields results that are different from those obtained from 
simple comparisons using a large control group of all with-domestic-currency countries.  
More specifically, we found that dollarized countries have had a slightly lower rate of 
growth than countries with a domestic currency; this difference, however, is not 
statistically significant.  We also found that GDP volatility has been significantly higher 
in dollarized economies, than in with-currency countries.   
According to our results, the probability of being a dollarized country depends on 
regional, geographical, political and structural variables.  More specifically, these results 
indicate that the probability of being a “dollarized” country is higher for very small – 
both in terms of population and initial GDP --, not independent countries (or territories), 
that are very open, and have a low degree of credibility. In order to measure credibility 
we build an index as a composite of institutional, structural and economic variables. 
Our analysis has not dealt with inflation.  There is evidence, however, strongly 
indicating that dollarized countries have experienced a significantly lower rate of 
inflation than countries with independent monetary policy.  Taken together, these results 
suggest that countries that give up their domestic currency, and officially dollarize their 
economies, face a trade off.  They will have lower inflation, higher volatility and 
approximately the same rate of growth.     19
APPENDIX: 
A Credibility Index 
 
In order to incorporate the role of political factors in the decision to adopt a hard-
peg regime, we use principal components to construct a “credibility” index. This index 
contains two types of variables: (a) variables that are related to the ability to build and 
sustain credible monetary institutions; and (b) variables that are related to inflationary 
bias, or inflationary temptation. In the first set we include a dummy for countries that 
have inherited the French legal system, which according to La Porta et al. (1999, p. 231-
232) is related to weaker institutions.
34 We have also included the number of years since 
the country’s independence. Countries that have become independent more recently are 
less likely to have strong institutions. Finally, we also included a variable that measures 
political instability, defined by Kaufmann et al. (1999). Political instability is likely to be 
related to the inability to build strong institutions (it might also be related to inflation 
bias). On the inflation bias side we have included a dummy for exporters of non-fuel 
primary products, since these are generally underdeveloped countries that are more likely 
to use inflation to finance fiscal imbalances. Also, we include a variable that captures an 
“inflationary neighborhood effect.”  We defined this variable as the average rate of 
inflation in the ten nearest countries. It is well known that while Central America is 
traditionally a region of low inflation, the contrary applies to South America.  
In order to build the credibility index we used a principal-components technique
35. 
This technique captures the common variability of all the variables included. The index 
gives lower values to countries that inherited the French legal system (leg_french), 
obtained their independence more recently (indepy), experience more political instability 
(instability), are exporters of non-fuel primary products (exp_prim) and whose neighbors 




                                                           
34 Also see Beck et al. (2002). 
35 On principal components see Green (2000). 
36 The corresponding eigenvalue is 1.43 and the principal component captures 26% of the total variance of 
the included varaibles.   20
Credibilityk  = -0.38*leg_french k + 0.36*indepy k - 0.66*instability k -0.49*exp_prim k -
0.19*neigh_inf k. 
 
The index has values that range from -5.24 to 3.16, with a mean of 0.00 and a median of 
0.03. A higher value of the index reflects a higher degree of credibility.  Among the 
countries with the highest values are Denmark, France, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United States. Countries with low values are, among others, 
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*Dollarized until 1982. 
I Denotes that the country in question is independent at the time of this writing.  Kiribati became 
independent in 1980; The Marshall Islands in 1987; Palau in 1995; and Tuvalu in 1979. 
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TABLE 2 
Growth, Volatility and Strict Dollarization: 
A Treatment Effects Model 
 
  GROWTH VOLATILITY 








































































































































































Number of obs  3,966  3,966  720  720  720 
Wald chi2  261.97  315.14  109.73  87.82  157.98 
Prob > chi2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 
* The upper panel contains the outcome equation. The lower panel contains the 
estimation of the treatment equation, or equation on the probability of being a “common 
currency country.” The numbers in parentheses are z-statistics.   27
TABLE 3 
Strict Dollarization vs. Fixed Exchange Rates: 
A Treatment Effects Model 
 
  GROWTH VOLATILITY 
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Number of obs  1,170  1,170  226  226  226 
Wald chi2  175.38  189.96  44.85  67.48  100.61 
Prob > chi2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 
* The upper panel contains the outcome equation. The lower panel contains the 
estimation of the treatment equation, or equation on the probability of being a “common 
currency country.” The numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. 